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The philosophy of medicine is a young discipline that can lay
claim to fewer monographs than would fill a single shelf on a
narrow bookcase. It thus sounds unimpressive to suggest that Alex
Broadbent’s Philosophy of Epidemiology belongs on any philoso-
pher of medicine’s shelf, as there is plenty of room. Instead, I will
recommend this superb study to any philosopher of medicine,
philosopher of science, reflective epidemiologist and intrepid
doctor.
Philosophy of Epidemiology inaugurates a new specialty in both
the philosophy of medicine and the philosophy of science. It is the
first book-length philosophical treatment of epidemiology, a
special science as deserving of the philosopher’s attention as
physics, math or biology. (For the benefit of the philosophers of
physics, math or biology, epidemiology, as defined in the book, is
‘the study of the distribution and determinants of disease and other
health states in human populations by means of group compari-
sons for the purpose of improving population health’ [1]).
As its author notes, the book is not a comprehensive treatment
of every philosophically interesting topic in epidemiology. Rather,
it explores a selective range of important philosophical topics
thrown up by epidemiology, most of which are conceptual or
epistemic. Some of the topics, such as those dealing with measures
of association, are peculiar to epidemiology, which is itself a
peculiar science. Other topics, including those concerned with
causation, have already received sustained attention from philoso-
phy of science, but benefit here from attention to epidemiology.
Where exactly does the philosophy of epidemiology fit in a
philosophy department course catalogue? Though Broadbent does
not define the philosophy of epidemiology explicitly, he compares
it with the philosophies of the special sciences like the philosophy
of physics. Broadbent avoids ‘intellectual territorialism’ in his
introduction [1], but I will risk it for a moment to help visualize the
landscape. The philosophy of epidemiology is nested within the
philosophy of science. The philosophy of medicine – I conjecture
– cuts across several sub-disciplines of the philosophy of science
[philosophy of epidemiology, philosophy of evidence-based medi-
cine (EBM), parts of philosophy of biology] as well as disciplines
outside of the philosophy of science (ethics, phenomenology, and
others).
The philosophical study of epidemiology overlaps somewhat
with the study of EBM but should be considered autonomous
from the study of EBM, just as the science of epidemiology is
autonomous from (but overlapping with) the practice of medi-
cine. (The first monograph on the philosophy of EBM has
already been written [2]). In fact, Broadbent writes that a philo-
sophical treatment of epidemiology, which is a new science,
ought ‘to reinforce the sense of epidemiology as a discipline in
its own right’ [1]. Autonomy has its advantages. While EBM and
the study of EBM have focused most of their attention on issues
around treatment efficacy/effectiveness (due to their preoccupa-
tion with randomized trials), epidemiologists more often study
harms through observational study designs. There is thus ample
opportunity for the philosophy of epidemiology to attend to this
woefully neglected area.
In the remainder of the introductory chapter, Broadbent lists
plenty of other reasons why epidemiology is philosophically inter-
esting: it is foremost concerned with hunting causes; it is charac-
terized by its methodology rather than by any domain-specific
theory; its methods of counting and comparison are relatively
domain-insensitive; it concerns populations and their properties;
and the stakes are high with epidemiological judgement, lives hang
in the balance [1].
Broadbent states that his purpose is to ‘explore and explain
rather than argue’ [1]. But, throughout the book, in addition to a
clear and fair reconstruction of various positions and arguments,
he provides reasonable criticism and thoughtful defence of his own
(often novel) positions. While his intention is not primarily to
defend a central thesis, the book does have a ‘central theme’: that
‘explanation deserves more epidemiological attention and causa-
tion less’ [1]; many conceptual and epistemic issues surrounding
causation in epidemiology could be clarified by focusing on expla-
nation (more on this idea later). The book returns to this theme
often, especially in chapters 3–7.
The rest of the book is structured into 11 chapters, most of
which explore a particular problem or related set of problems.
Chapter 2 provides some introductions to the problem of induc-
tion, causation, the history of epidemiology and some basic epi-
demiological study designs. Chapter 3 sets out and explores the
causal interpretation problem: how the causal import of measures
of association is to be interpreted. Chapters 4–5 develop principles
of good causal inference in epidemiology. Chapters 6–7 develop
principles of good prediction making. Chapter 8 attempts to under-
stand the causal meaning of one particular measure of public
health concern: the attributable fraction. Chapter 9 asks whether
there is any epistemic basis for ‘risk relativism’, a preference for
the relative risk (RR) measure. Chapter 10 examines the
monocausal and multifactorial models of disease aetiology, and
suggests an alternate contrastive model of disease. Chapter 11
wonders what epidemiological evidence can say about the cause of
specific cases of disease, and thus about the relevance of epide-
miological evidence in the courts. Finally, Chapter 12 is a brief
section that restates the central theme.
At the outset, Broadbent sets for himself ‘the ideal of a thor-
oughly philosophical yet thoroughly engaged treatment’, which he
admits may be elusive [1]. The book teeters at times towards the
‘thoroughly philosophical’ – chapter 3 on the causal interpretation
of epidemiological measures is perhaps a philosopher’s chapter –
and at other times towards the ‘thoroughly engaged’ – chapters 9
and 11 engage largely with arguments in the epidemiological lit-
erature and the legal literature, respectively. Epidemiologist
Sander Greenland is listed as many times in the References as
philosopher Nancy Cartwright. Part of Broadbent’s heavy reliance
on sources outside of philosophy is explained by the lack of
attention that the (important) questions he tackles have received
from philosophy. Philosophically interesting questions are often
first noticed because they vex scientists. However, even after a
philosophical literature is built up around a question, engagement
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with practice is a desideratum rather than a detriment to
philosophy. Indeed, such engagement is characteristic of the phi-
losophy of medicine, including some of its best work.
Perhaps the greatest virtue of Broadbent’s monograph is the
clarity and perspective it brings to questions that are not just
problems in epidemiology or medicine, but for epidemiology and
medicine – problems of great practical import. For instance, chapter
11 questions whether there are any grounds, epistemic or otherwise,
for the privileging of ‘relative measures’ in modern epidemiology
and medicine. Commentators often complain that the preference for
reporting the RR or relative risk reduction (RRR) is groundless
(unless one counts less savory private motivations), and has led to
serious distortions in the evidence base that could harm patients1
[3,4]. Engaging with the concerns of epidemiologists is profitable
for philosophy of science as well. Broadbent speculates that the
preference for the RR might be due to the long shadow that physics
casts over other sciences; the RR of a given exposure is usually
thought to be population invariant, or universal, analogous to the
laws of physics. But epidemiologists should doubt the universality
of any measure of association, and philosophers should likewise
resist the urge to conform population-level phenomena to a scien-
tific image based on the physics worldview.
Even if one sets aside the practical significance of the book, it still
stands as an important contribution to the philosophy of science.
Among its merits, it sheds light on the topic of prediction in science,
which has received scant attention from philosophers. It develops
theories of causal inference and prediction that are suitably abstract
to be broadly relevant, and that connect with existing work in the
philosophy of science on mechanisms and on extrapolation.
Broadbent succeeds at meeting the demands of philosophical
rigour and practical engagement, even if certain problems he
tackles are more recognizably ‘philosophical problems’ than
others. In fact, that some problems are unfamiliar to the philoso-
pher is evidence of the book’s success. It shows a willingness to
address novel issues, and also shows that the book takes seriously
their novelty rather than attempting to force them into existing
models as merely tokens of old, familiar problems. Perhaps some
of the problems Broadbent tackles are scientific problems, but it
does not follow that they are therefore not philosophical problems.
Some questions are not the exclusive domain of philosophy or
science, and deserve attention from both philosophers and scien-
tists. Epidemiologists should care about their concepts and epis-
temological devices just as much as philosophers.
My criticisms of the book are few and minor. Broadbent devel-
ops his central theme (more explanation, less causation) in most
detail at the end of chapter 3. He proposes that the model of
contrastive causal explanation developed by Peter Lipton [5] holds
the answers to many problems that the book sets out to address: the
causal interpretation problem, causal inference, prediction making
and models of disease aetiology [1]. Given its importance for
Broadbent’s own solutions to these problems, the topic of expla-
nation probably deserved a chapter of its own. In particular, the
contrastive model could have been contrasted with other explana-
tory models, and its adaptation to group comparisons (from its
origin in single event comparisons) could have been developed
more substantially.
The book persuaded me that an explanatory approach to prob-
lems related to causation in epidemiology can be useful. Thus, I
accepted the argument that explanation deserves more attention.
However, I was not completely convinced that causation deserves
less attention, as the rest of Broadbent’s central theme states. For
one thing, the explanations he advocates are causal explanations.
But, more importantly, rather than fully resolving the ambiguities
of population causal thinking in epidemiology, the explanatory
approach seems to push the ambiguities down onto the level of
individual cases (individual causation). For example, part of his
explanatory solution to the problem of assessing the causal
meaning of population measures (chapter 3) is to say that measures
of association like the RR quantify over individual cases [1]. But,
we are left wondering as to the nature of these singular causal
facts. That is not to say that Broadbent’s solution is not successful;
having started with two problems (general causation and individ-
ual causation), we are now left with only one. Yet one could argue
that causation at the individual level is deserving of more attention
in epidemiology, not less. Epidemiology is after all a discipline
that – as the book mentions – counts the case-control study among
its methods.2
This objection should not be seen as highlighting any weakness
of the text; I think it shows that the book succeeds in unpacking
very interesting questions about the scope of epidemiology and the
relationship between population-level and individual-level causal
claims. Philosophy of Epidemiology asks fruitful questions and
provides insightful diagnoses for many of epidemiology’s philo-
sophical woes – and does it with eloquence and personality. It
brilliantly opens up an entire sub-discipline in the philosophy of
medicine that – like the book – I hope will receive the serious
attention from philosophers and epidemiologists that it deserves.
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1 The RR and RRR represent the average treatment effect as a ratio, with
the base rate (control rate, untreated rate) as the divisor. By comparison, the
absolute risk reduction (ARR) represents the treatment effect as a differ-
ence in outcome. If the base rate of an undesired outcome in a population
is 2% and the treatment lowers the rate to 1%, then the ARR is 1%. Since
this reduction of 1% represents half of the base rate, the corresponding
RRR is 50%. The RRR can be misleading; it might lead the patient (and
doctor) to think that it is a coin toss whether the patient will benefit or not,
when really the net benefit from treatment in the population is only 1%.
Patients with a distorted view of the effectiveness of treatment might make
the wrong decisions, which can in turn be harmful.
2 In a comparative group study (e.g. a clinical trial), we can determine
whether an exposure caused the outcome in some patients, but not which
patients (some exposed patients would have gotten the outcome anyway
regardless of the exposure). In a case-control study, the investigator
attempts to determine whether the exposure caused the outcome in a
particular patient (the case) by comparing them to an unexposed but other-
wise similar patient that lacked the outcome (the control). Thus, it is false
that epidemiology deals only with causation in populations and not in
individuals, as might be mistakenly thought.
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